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For some time now there has been extensive discussion on the role of 
species membership in determining an individual's moral status. Some, 
most prominently Peter Singer, have argued that to base a moral 
determination on species membership amounts to speciesism - "a 
prejudice or attitude of bias toward the interests of members of one's own 
species and against those of members of other species"1 - and that this is as 
arbitrary, unjustified and morally repugnant as racism or sexism. Others, 
most commonly conservative Christian thinkers, have argued that human 
beings obviously have greater moral status than animals and have thus 
defended the concept of speciesism as morally acceptable. 
It is my position that philosophers like Singer are quite correct in that 
membership in a species is morally insignificant and that Singer's 
opponents ought not to argue against this fact. Rather, what they ought to 
say is that human beings have greater moral status, not because we are 
members of the species "Homo sapiens" but because of other, more 
significant factors; namely that we are designed to have proper functions 
that confer on us an extremely high moral status. 
To begin with, let us examine the concept of "species" to see why it 
is not helpful in determining moral status. 
Problems with "Species" 
The concept "species" is extremely problematic if used to determine 
moral status. To begin with, it is not entirely clear that "species" can be 
understood properly as anything other than a class that can be reduced to a 
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historic "individuaF Also, there are several different ways of classifying 
species\ and thus it seems that it is entirely conceivable that a given 
individual could be considered a member of more than one distinct species 
simultaneously, and could thus have vastly different moral standings 
simultaneously. Finally, in some cases it seems that contemporary 
evolutionary biology can't rule out that a human individual might be able 
to become a member of a new and different species and yet remain 
unchanged in any sense that seems to have moral significance. Let us then 
examine these arguments individually. 
History of Origin 
In his article, A Matter of Individuality, David Hull makes some 
interesting statements about the concept of "species" that are particularly 
relevant to my argument. He explains that "species" have generally been 
understood as "spatiotemporally unrestricted classes," but his position is 
that this understanding is false. Rather, he argues that "species" are 
actually "spatiotemporally localized individuals, historic entities". 
The point is that "species" are historically localized things. Hull 
explains: "If a species evolved which was identical to a species of extinct 
pterodactyl save origin, it would still be a new, distinct species,"4 a claim, 
he points out, that is entirely consistent with, and in fact seems to emerge 
from Darwinian Theory. 
It is metaphysically possible for there to be another planet on the 
other side of the universe that is in every way, shape, and form identical to 
the planet on which we live. On this planet there could exist beings that in 
no way, shape, or form differ from you or me, other than their historical 
origin and present reproductive community -let's assume that they could 
reproduce with us if we came in contact. These creatures would be human 
beings, indistinguishable from us, but would not be members of the species 
Homo sapiens. It seems incorrect to say that other individuals, who are in 
every way indistinguishable from you and me, have a lesser moral status 
because the history of their origin is not the same as ours. Yet a speciesist 
position would have to claim that very thing. 
Multiplicity 
In his article, Species, Philip Kitcher lists several definitions of 
"species", given by various scholars. Mayr's view is: "species are groups 
of interbreeding natural populations that are reproductively isolated from 
other such groups."5 Simpson, Hennig, and Wiley hold the view that 
species are: "the set of organisms in a lineage (a sequence of ancestral-
descendant populations) bounded by successive speciation events."6 
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Simpson qualifies this by claiming: "Speciation events themselves can be 
understood either as events in which a descendant population becomes 
reproductively isolated from its ancestors."7 Or, as Hennig and Wiley add: 
"as events in which an ancestral population gives rise to two descendant 
populations which are reproductively isolated from one another."8 The 
view of van Valen with regard to speciation is that it is: "a process in which 
descendant populations are ecologically differentiated from their 
ancestors."9 Sokal and Sneath argued that this classification ought to be 
done by: "dividing organisms into species by constructing a measure of 
overall similarity and taking species to be sets of organisms which are 
clustered by this measure." 10 And others, such as Nelson and Platnick, have 
argued that: "a species is a set of organisms distinguished by their common 
possession of a 'minimal evolutionary novelty ' ." '' 
It would appear that there are a rather large number of ways of 
categorizing and understanding "species". Kitcher, however, is not dismayed 
by the many different options. He insists that "species" are real things that 
exist in the world. However, he claims that there are legitimately many 
possible ways to classify species. He contends that this plurality is based 
on the diversity of the aims of categorization. Thus, it is entirely acceptable 
for there to be different c1iterion and still such a thing as species. He writes: 
"There are many different contexts of investigation in which the concept of 
species is employed, and ... the currently favored set of species taxa has 
emerged through a history in which different groups of organisms have 
been classified by biologists working on different biological problems.' '12 
While Kitcher's view is all well and good with respect to embracing 
diversity and might be pragmatically acceptable to a wide range of 
biologists, this view offers no help for those who would like to use species 
membership as a criterion for determining an individual's moral status. If 
Kitcher is correct, then it is entirely possible that a given organism could be 
classified as species A under one classification system and classified as 
species B under another. If a given individual can legitimately be classified 
in a multiplicity of species simultaneously and species membership is the 
basis of moral status, then a given individual can have a multiplicity 
different moral statuses simultaneously. This raises the possibility of an 
individual being having an extremely high moral status under one standard 
while having a lesser moral status under a different standard, 
simultaneously. It seems counterintuitive that a single individual could 
have both a high and a low moral status, simultaneously. 
If Kitcher's view is correct, it shows that the concept "species" is 
extremely messy. It is entirely unclear and unlikely that this understanding 
of "species" can help us to determine an individual's moral status. Thus, 
"species" remains a serious problem. 
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Reproductive Community 
Finally, assuming that we can ever come up with a good definition of 
"species" - though clearly historical origin and reproductive community 
would be involved- there are still serious problems with grounding moral 
status on species. Let's suppose that there is a terrorist attack on New York 
City such that the entire population of the city is exposed to a mutating 
chemical. This chemical changes the reproductive capacity of any human 
being who comes in contact with it such that that individual can only 
reproduce with other individuals who have been in contact with the 
chemical and that this trait is inherited by all of their offspring. It looks like 
we would have an entirely new species in New York City that- other than 
reproductively- would be indistinguishable from the species Homo sapiens. 
While a biologist might not see a problem with this, it would be extremely 
problematic if moral status is determined by species membership. Are the 
members of the new species importantly different from members of Homo 
sapiens? Only their reproductive community has changed so I'm not sure 
why they would be. And yet a speciesist would have to claim that they do not 
necessarily possess the same moral status as members of Homo sapiens. 
Thus it seems that philosophers such as Peter Singer, who claim that 
determining moral status based merely upon species membership is entirely 
irrational, are con·ect. It seems untenable to claim that one's reproductive 
community and historical origin are the basis of one's high moral status. Yet, 
many thinkers have the strong intuition that human beings have an extremely 
greater moral status than chimpanzees, dolphins or dogs. Is this view 
speciesism- a clearly itTational position- or is it based on something more? 
Characteristically Human Functions 
It might be argued that the special moral status of human beings is 
based on the manifestation of characteristically human functions, such as 
rationality and will. This line of argumentation might work when we are 
discussing normal, healthy, adult human beings. This, however, does not 
actually accomplish that which those opposed to Singer's view ultimately 
wish to accomplish. Singer argues that this line of reasoning is a very good 
argument for saying why some animals have a higher moral status than 
some human beings.13 
Singer, along with many other philosophers, argues that infants -
especially those still in the womb - and retarded human beings, do not 
actually possess these characteristically human traits, or at least do not 
possess these traits at a superior level of development to chimpanzees, dogs or 
several other animals all of whom seem to have at least some ability to 
utilize rational thought and to will. Therefore, these philosophers would 
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argue that claiming that an infant or mentally retarded adult has a higher 
moral status than these animals cannot be based on the possession of these 
traits, but rather on speciesism. If one actually wants to base a detennination of 
moral status on these traits one must agree that these animals have a higher 
moral status than human infants and mentally retarded human beings. 
The problem is that those who argue that human beings always have 
greater moral status will not accept an argument that entails a chimpanzee 
having a higher moral status than a human infant. Confused on how to 
proceed, they turn to a defense of speciesism in an attempt to salvage their 
intuitions. This, however, is not the correct answer to this problem. It is 
true that human beings always have a greater moral status than animals but 
it is not because of the manifestation of characteristically human traits or 
because of our membership in the species Homo sapiens. 
Personhood 
A central element to this discussion lies in the concept of "personhood" 
and the moral value attached to it. Countless philosophers base their 
determination of"personhood" (and the moral value that goes along with it) on 
things that an individual does - or is perhaps physically capable of doing. 
Usually, the determination has something to do with the manifestation of 
cognitive abilities and of abilities to act or will. It is my view that to take up 
this method of determining "personhood" is to confuse that which a thing 
is with that which that sort of thing characteristically does. A "person" is a 
substance that characteristically has certain powers -for example: will and 
intellect. However, even if these powers are merely metaphysically potential 
to the substance and never actually manifest or have not yet manifest, all that 
would mean is that that person is in a piivative condition- something that 
ought to be there (i.e.: these powers) was absent- not that it wasn't a person. 
It is also extremely important to understand what is meant by other 
terms frequently used in this discussion. By "human being" I mean an 
individual being who is genetically like myself and the reader - a being 
that has "human" DNA - who can survive even if our species changed 
through reproductive mutation, or isolation. Incidentally, at this time and to 
the best of our knowledge, this group of individuals coincides with the 
things we generally classify as "Homo sapiens" but, as I have explained, 
this is not metaphysically necessary. 14 
We ought to treat infants - in and out of the womb - those with 
Alzheimer's disease, the mentally retarded, etc. as persons, even though 
they have not yet, no longer, or physically may never have manifest the 
traits typically associated with "personhood" and even though their claim 
to possession of these traits is only rooted in the fact that they are human 
beings, not in the probability - or even the physical possibility - of these 
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traits ever being manifest. 15 It is my contention that the sort of thing that a 
human being is necessarily entails personhood - though not all persons are 
human beings 16 - whether or not the individual human being has 
developed enough to manifest "personhood traits" and whether or not the 
individual human being has some disorder that has caused these traits to 
not/no longer be manifest. 17 In addition to this, it is my view that "personhood" 
carries with it the highest moral status. Thus, the state of being a human being 
-irrespective of developmental state or the presence of privations -carries 
with it the highest rights to protection and responsibilities for us to aid this 
individual, simply because of the sort of things that human beings are. 
If this high moral status has nothing to do with species membership, 
nor with the manifestation of specific traits, what then can we say gives human 
persons this extremely high moral status? The answer is quite simple. 
The Necessity of Divine Design 
In chapter eleven of his book, Warrant and Proper Function, Alvin 
Plantinga explores the question of whether a naturalist account can ever 
give a satisfactory account of proper function - another way of saying 
"characteristic function." After exploring some of the most philosophically 
important attempts, he comes to the conclusion that in order to have a 
naturalist epistemology we must adopt a supernatural ontology. 
First of all, Plantinga addresses Pollock's position that something is 
functioning normally if it functions in the way it does most of the time -
the "usual way". He counters this position with a litany of conditions -like 
elderly carpenters with missing fingers, sperm that fail to fertilize an egg, 
or baby turtles that do not reach adulthood- all of which, though statistically 
more common, can't be seen as proper functions of the individuals involved. 
Secondly, Plantinga addresses Millikan's position that proper 
function has to do with powers that account for the individual's survival or 
the survival of its ancestors. He begins by answering that it is not necessary 
for a thing to have ancestors for it to have a proper function; it seems clear 
that Adam's heart had a function even though he was the first man. Then he 
goes on to explain that just because a trait contributes to an individual's 
survival does not mean that the trait is a proper function. He illustrates this 
point with a story about an evil leader inducing a mutation that causes pain 
and dramatically reduced sight in a sub-set of a racial minority and then 
killing the rest of that minority. The pain in the afflicted individuals is so 
great as to not only impair their sight but also to impair their cognitive 
function dramatically. It seems clear that those with the mutation survived 
because of it but it also seems that it is a mistake to say that their eyes are 
functioning properly in this condition. However, an evolutionary account 
would have to say that such a condition is a proper function in these 
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individuals, given that possession this trait enabled the individual to 
survive and have offspring. Thus it would be irrational to treat such a 
condition, which seems extremely counter-intuitive. 
Plantinga concludes by stating: "If, as it looks, it is in fact impossible 
to give an account of function in naturalistic terms, then metaphysical 
naturalism and naturalist epistemology are at best uneasy bedfellows. The 
right way to be a naturalist in epistemology is to be a super-naturalist in 
metaphysics. 18 
The point that Plantinga is trying to make here is that if we are to 
salvage our notion of proper function in things, which seems not only 
obvious to our general intuitions but absolutely necessary for any cogent 
notion of health and disease let alone the majority of natural science, then 
we have to have an ontology that includes a supematural, intelligent designer. 19 
This solution may be the only way to salvage our intuitions that 
human infants, Alzheimer's patients, mentally retarded human beings etc. 
have higher moral status than chimpanzees, dolphins, dogs or other 
animals. It seems obvious that if one is in a burning building and has to 
choose between saving a mentally retarded human being and a 
chimpanzee, one ought to save the mentally retarded human being, even if 
the chimpanzee has manifest more "personhood traits" than the mentally 
retarded human being. Most would consider it immoral to allow the mentally 
retarded human being to die while saving the chimpanzee. Therefore, it seems 
that we must appeal to some notion of design to remain true to our 
intuitions. The problem is that when we discuss a design, we imply some 
sort of designer. But, if Plantinga is correct, then our problem is solved. 
If proper function and moral status are not determined by species 
classification - which seems dangerously close to arbitrary -but rather by 
a designer, namely God, then we have our solution. The category in 
question is "Human being" rather than "Homo sapiens". Only coincidentally 
do these categories currently share the same members -to the best of our 
knowledge - at the present time, but this need not be the case. God could 
create another group of human beings, on a different planet, who would be 
identical to the human beings on Earth with the exception of the history of 
their origin. These two groups would both be human beings but only the 
human beings that originated on Earth would be Homo sapiens. 
God designed things to function in certain ways. We can generally 
observe the evidence of this in that while the naturalistic categories fail, 
groups still seem to function in consistent ways. This is why our intuition is 
such that if something deviates from this norm, it is dysfunctional or has a 
privation. 
This norm is not statistical, by any means. Let's suppose that all of a 
sudden, every human being had only one leg and all of our future offspring 
had only one leg. A universal condition like this is a problem for a species 
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membership-based account of health because it would be hard to say that 
this was dysfunctional once a certain number of members of the species 
had the trait. For the Divine design account, there is no problem. Yes, our 
intuitions are correct and there is something wrong with this situation, not 
because it deviates from the species norm, but because it deviates from the 
norm of God's design. So, even if nearly everyone was dysfunctional, that 
would not thereby make the dysfunctional functional nor would it make 
the functional dysfunctional. 
This also solves another serious problem in the philosophical 
discourse on personhood. As I explained earlier, "personhood" is generally 
identified with the manifestation of specific traits - the most common is 
rationality. The problem with this is that human beings manifest these traits 
over time and these traits also tend to fade over time. It, also, is not entirely 
clear that other things that we are rightly reluctant to call "persons" do not 
have some of these traits as well - higher mammals, super-sophisticated 
computers, etc. I do not believe that our reluctance to call these other 
things "persons" is based in "speciesism"20 nor do I think that we ought to 
ever defend speciesism. Rather I think that this intuition is based on our 
knowledge - at some level - that we, human beings, are significantly 
different than these other things. How are we different? We were designed 
by God in such a way that we are fundamentally different from everything 
else in His creation. 
The traits that we associate with "personhood" are simply 
characteristics that human beings are supposed - were designed, by God -
to have. By virtue of being a human being, these traits ought to be present 
or to develop in the individual. It is a mistake to speak of human beings as 
if they were ever other than "persons". When speaking of a pre-born 
human being or a small child as a "potential person" it is more proper to 
say that these human beings have the potential to manifest X, Y and Z 
personhood traits. When there is a situation, such as a mentally retarded 
human being, where it seems impossible for the individual to develop these 
traits, it is proper to say that the individual suffers a privation - something 
that ought to be present, according to God's design, is absent- not to say 
that the congenitally retarded child is not a person. 
It makes little to no sense to determine an individual's moral status 
based on species membership or the manifestation of traits. All human 
beings are morally significant, deserving of the highest degree of 
protection, and requiring of the highest responsibility from others to 
provide necessary aid, whether or not they manifest the traits commonly 
associated with "personhood". The reason does not lie in some preference 
of a biological class, it lies in the fact that part of the design with which 
human beings have been endowed by God is that we are of the highest 
moral significance. In other words, we are not morally significant because 
152 Linacre Quarterly 
of our species or the manifestation of certain personhood traits, but 
because God designed us so to be. 
This is not to say that animals are morally irrelevant. If we accept the 
Divine design account it does not imply that human beings are the only 
things with any moral status in the universe. Clearly, animals are the kinds 
of things that we ought to treat responsibly; they have some moral 
significance. Therefore, torturing animals or experimenting on them 
frivolously- for example: for the purposes of developing cosmetics- is 
morally wrong. However, it is ridiculous to say that animals ever have the 
same moral status as human beings and that it is thus never morally 
acceptable to kill, experiment upon, or utilize them in any way. 
Certainly, there will be some who reject this account because God is 
involved. However, if there were individuals who did not believe in the 
number 3, that state of affairs would not change the proper answer to the 
equation 1 +2 and it would be ridiculous to drop the correct answer because 
of their disbelief. Commonsense ethics require a divine foundation. In 
order to maintain our most deeply held intuitions, adopting a supernatural 
ontology is absolutely necessary. The alternative is to give up our notions 
of health, disease and proper function, not to mention our deeply 
entrenched beliefs about our responsibility regarding infants and 
cognitively impaired human beingsY 
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